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1. Introduction
The literature has widely discussed the role of cooperative banks1 (CBs) in local development, as well as 
their contribution in mobilizing local savings and expanding access to credit to both households and small 
businesses (Petersen, 1995; Berger et al., 1999; DeYoung et al., 1999; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2001; 
Goglio, 2009). It is pivotal to better understand how these institutions function, as well as the associated 
outcomes, in order to then study their impact on the economic and banking system. CBs can be viewed as 
financial intermediaries whose stated main goal is to increase their members’ welfare and whose owners (the 
members) do not always receive dividends from their shares2. According to these facts, it is rather obvious 
that CBs cannot be generically classified as “for-profit” banks; hence, they are usually treated as 
“not-for-profit” banks. However, “not-for-profit” banks are a heterogeneous group of institutions. Various 
types of not-for-profit banks include: mutual saving banks, mutual savings and credit unions in the United 
States (US), building societies and credit unions in the United Kingdom (UK), and cooperative banks in 
Europe, such as Raiffeisen and Volksbank. Among not-for-profit banks, the most common types are cooperative 
banks (including in this case also Banche Popolari and Volksbank) and credit unions.
Since these banks are not profit-driven, understanding and precisely defining their objectives for the 
purposes of theoretical investigation becomes an interesting and challenging task. In this paper, we attempt 
to describe how cooperative banks manage to provide privileges to its members, who form the bank’s 
ownership structure. In particular, we are interested in understanding the magnitude of member benefits 
received for deposits or loans, compared to non-members. These member benefits include preferential 
treatment through favorable interest rates both on loans and deposits. In this paper, we restrict our focus 
to the monetary aspects of member benefits, which include preferential treatment through both better 
terms and favorable interest rates on loans as well as deposits. However, non-monetary social benefits can 
be appropriately introduced into this framework, if so desired. 
Unlike cooperative banks, which are recognized as banks, credit unions are more challenging to define. 
According to the Oxford Dictionary of Economics (2009), a bank is defined as a financial institution whose 
main activities are borrowing and lending money. Does this properly define credit unions? As defined by 
Berthoud and Hinton (1989), credit unions are “cooperative societies that offer loans to their members out 
of the pool of savings that are built up by members”. By being suppliers of loans and collectors of deposits, 
credit unions can be considered financial institutions, yet not actually banks. Accordingly, the US Federal 
Reserve defines credit unions as depository institutions, not banks, thus does not supervise or regulate 
them.
Contrarily in the UK, the Prudential Regulation Authority regulates credit unions. However, the bank 
of England clearly states that credit unions are not the same as banks. According to its definition expressed
1 In this paper, the expression “cooperative banks” is used interchangeably with and as shorthand of “cooperative financial institutions”. 
In the case of Italy, Germany and Austria, Banche di Credito Cooperativo and Raiffeisen are usually included in the broader set of 
cooperative banks. Dissimilarly, given the difference in the dividends redistribution policy and the fact of not being subject to 
mutuality requirements (at least in the Italian case), Banche Popolari as well as Volksbanks are not considered into the cooperative 
banks group, at least for the purpose of this paper.
2 As an example, in the case of Italian Banche di Credito Cooperativo (BCCs), the Italian Civil Code Art. 2514 establishes that 
BCCs cannot distribute dividends on the subscribed capital superior to the maximum interest of postal bonds increased by 2.5 
per cent. This limit regards “dividends.” Moreover, these cooperatives cannot distribute reserves to user-members and in case of 
dissolution; they shall return all their assets to the mutual funds for the promotion and the development of cooperation (Fici, 
2010).
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by Muqtadir (2013), credit unions are “mutual societies that are run as financial cooperatives. They are 
community based organizations […] set up for the benefit of a particular group or community that share 
a common bond. This common bond might be living or working in certain area, belonging to a particular 
organization, or working for a certain employer”. Figure 1 attempts to graphically capture the discussion 
above.
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Given that their business is strictly catered only to members, credit unions can be viewed as a 
special case of cooperative financial institutions—one without non-member customers. The absence 
of non-member customers could reduce the agency problem3; in terms of modeling, it simplifies the 
bank’s objective function. In contrast, cooperative banks usually include non-member customers in 
addition to its members. The differing characteristics of these two bank types imply that we cannot 
analyze and understand their activities through using a restrict model. In this paper, we attempt to 
modify a model of credit union behavior by generalizing it so as to incorporate additional 
characteristics that are specific to CBs. We are interested in understanding the problem of interest 
rate determination while preferential member treatment is present. This is important because the 
presence of non-member customers introduces new complexities in the optimal problem setting to 
define members’ privileges. Non-members indirectly contribute to financing members’ privileges 
since, at least in theory, they pay relatively higher interest rates on loans compared to members. 
They also provide the bank with deposits. Higher shares of non-members result in more resources 
for members. CBs not only have to deal with the member-to-non-member antagonism, but also with 
the internal battle of benefit distribution between borrowers and depositors.  
The extent to which members forgo the option of taking more loans instead of receiving better 
privileges would depend on their own demand for loans. In our framework, the amount of loans 
borrowed will determine each member’s preference for either a borrower- or depositor-oriented 
policy on interest rates. It is the CB’s responsibility to set appropriate interest rates on loans and 
deposits in order to be incentive compatible and to distribute the available resources between the 
two groups of members (borrowers and depositors). In order to do so, we need to consider three 
different relationships, paired with their motivations: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Referring to Figure 1, in Alexopoulos et al. (2013) the absence of non-members will reduce the number of principals 
controlling both the board of directors and the manager and will mitigate the agency problem.  
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1. Customers vs. non-customers: The decision of the customers to approach cooperative banks, rather than 
financial intermediaries, is often motivated by financial conditions (for simplicity we consider the case 
of better interest rates) for both loans and deposits4.
2. Members vs. non-members: Among customers, members need to be repaid for their role in the ownership of 
the CB. This is typically in terms of better interest rates and not through dividend payments, in lines 
with their “not-for-profit” motive.
3. Borrowers vs. Depositors: Among members, the distribution of the welfare gains between the two 
categories (borrowers and depositors) also matters. The eventual magnitudes of privilege (i.e., terms 
for loans and deposits) will depend on which member category forms the majority.
There are models describing how credit unions set their interest rates to compensate members (Smith 
et al., 1981; Emmons and Mueller, 1998; Emmons and Schimd, 2002). To the best of our knowledge, 
general models describing the activities of all types of cooperative banks are not available. In this paper, we 
attempt to develop a baseline normative model, which can be extended to incorporate additional features. 
The questions that we try to address are: What are the optimal interest rates (for loans and deposits) for a 
welfare-maximizing cooperative bank that privileges its members, and on what do they depend? Second, 
how do these interest rates change according to the distribution of members (i.e. whether borrowers or 
depositors represent the majority group)?
The paper is organized as followed: Section 2 surveys the relevant literature, in particular, those 
comparing cooperative banks and credit unions. Section 3 presents some broad empirical patterns 
regarding the pattern of member shares across countries. Section 4 defines the theoretical model, then 
Section 5 comments on the main findings. Section 6 closes through further discussion and suggesting 
possible extensions of the model. 
2. Cooperative banks and credit unions: A literature review
In order to address the questions concerning the pricing decision of CBs, it is important to understand 
their peculiarities and specific goals. As noted in Smith et al. (1981, p. 519), two characteristics distinguish 
credit unions from other types of banks: (i) the members are simultaneously bank owners, customers of 
the outputs and suppliers of the inputs, and (ii) both the demand and the supply sides are transacted 
within the same enterprises, since the bank includes both member-borrowers and member-depositors. 
These characteristics could be applied to CBs as well when dealing solely with members. Given their 
ownership structure, CBs cannot be considered profit maximizers. Pantaleoni (1898; 1924) raised the 
issue concerning cooperative enterprises’ aim by arguing that cooperatives were not charitable institutions, 
but instead driven by their members’ selfish expectations. Member welfare lies at the core of cooperative 
actions. According to standard microeconomic theory, under perfect competition, cooperatives will not be 
able to maximize consumer and producer surplus since they do not explicitly focus on profit maximization.
4 There might be other reasons as well, such as the absence of alternative options to borrow in the nearby area, low penetration 
of commercial banks, etc. Even in this case, these geographical constraints would mean an increase in transaction costs (and 
opportunity costs) for the customer, thus should be added while comparing various banks’ costs and benefits. For simplicity, 
we assume that the customer’s decision is motivated purely by interest rate differences in the presence of substitute options.
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Focusing on banks with a cooperative ownership structure, some authors have interpreted them as 
cost-minimizing enterprises (Taylor, 1977), similarly to public/state enterprises. However, this vision does 
not take into consideration their cooperative aim. The objective of CBs is to benefit their members, in 
line with their cooperative principles. The benefits accruing to the CBs’ owners are not restricted to solely 
financial gains; CBs maximize the members’ so-called wealth rather than just profits. Social factors, local 
development and human capital can be included in the CB’s objective function. Members benefit from the 
public good created by CBs: the availability of a financial service. However, non-members can benefit from 
the availability of this public good as well, behaving as free riders. 
CBs redistribute their profits through price subsidies - i.e., through lower interest rates on loans or 
higher interest on deposits (Hart and Moore, 1998). On the one hand, this may be seen as distorting the 
invisible hand in the market by distorting prices, but on the other hand, it helps CBs realize their stated 
objective. 
However, given that the amount of resources to be redistributed is limited, a potential conflict among 
members can arise. This is particularly so since borrowers and depositors have not only different, but often 
opposing concerns. Therefore individual utility may be at the cost of another’s. Even though both types 
of members (borrowers and depositors) may gain from better interest rates compared to non-members, 
there is a potential internal conflict concerning the benefit allocation. The conflict resolution is based on 
the prevalence of one type of member over the other (Smith et al., 1981; Emmons and Schimd, 2002). 
When members are asked to vote in the general assembly, if the median voter shifts from borrower to 
depositor, the resulting benefit redistribution choice could change accordingly. Thus, the choice between 
keeping low interest on loans or raising the price of credit depends on the composition of the majority in 
the assembly (Emmons and Mueller, 1997). The decisions regarding the allocation of the surplus can 
ultimately be related with the interest rates charged on loans and deposits (Emmons and Schimd, 2002). 
While analyzing German CBs, Emmons and Mueller (1997) show that a shift in the median member 
from being predominantly borrower-oriented towards being predominantly lender-orientated causes a 
corresponding shift in the cooperative banks pricing policy. In this case, it moved from having underpriced 
credit towards the provision of competitively priced credit and deposit services.
While the internal quarrel between borrowers and depositors remains in the case of credit unions, the 
discrimination of interest rates between members and non-members disappears. This is because, in 
contrast to cooperative banks, credit unions do not serve non-members. According to Croteau (1963), 
credit unions are the purest form of cooperative financial institutions for two reasons: (i) they restrict 
transactions to members only, and (ii) the membership is constrained to those belonging to a common 
bond. Credit unions collect deposits solely from members and lend only to members. Users, management 
and beneficiaries are only found among credit unions’ members (Ward and McKillop, 1997). In this sense, 
credit unions can be considered as a subset of cooperative banks, whose customers are also always 
members. The restriction to a common bond is a fundamental point for these banks’ success, since it implies 
reciprocal knowledge and moral persuasion in the case of opportunistic behavior. 
In the literature, the theoretical framework for credit unions setting interest rates has been well 
developed (Smith et al., 1981; Smith, 1984, 1988). Contrarily, other forms of cooperative banks have 
received less attention; in particular, studies emphasizing the influence of members and non-members are 
extremely rare.  
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3. Member-to-customer ratio patterns
Focusing on broad descriptive statistics concerning CBs across the world, it is possible to realize how 
much situations can vary. On the one hand, CBs are largely present in Europe, even though it is also possible 
to find a large number in Canada and Japan. In Europe, CBs play an important role in the economic 
and financial system. There are almost 4,000 European CBs with 71,000 branches and more than 
200 million customers, mainly consumers, communities and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
(EACB, 2013). Among customers, more than 50 million are members, while 180 million are non-members5. 
CBs around the world show substantial differences in terms of their spatial characteristics and lending 
models. In some countries, such as Italy, CBs have remained small and local with an internal decision 
board of directors; in others, as in the case of the Netherlands, CBs are integrated in a vertical structure, 
where the decisional autonomy of each bank is very restricted.  
Credit unions, on the other hand, are mainly located in the Anglo-Saxon world. At the end of 2012, 
there were almost 53,000 credit unions spread over 101 countries around the world, with more than 200 
million members. The countries with the most credit union activity are highly diverse. They range from the 
US, with the highest number of members at 92 million and possessing a 45.4 per cent penetration share, 
to Canada with a share of 43.7 per cent penetration, to others, such as Kenya (penetration share equal to 
19.5%), South Korea (16.5%), Mexico (4.9%), Brazil (3.4%) and India (2.5%) (see footnote 5). 
Focusing on CBs, the “member-to-customer ratio” greatly varies among European countries. Data 
collected for the CBs Federation bodies show that while the Dutch Rabobank has roughly 71,000 
customers per bank, the German DZ has around 23,000 customers. The ratio is more than five-to-one in 
the first case, while it falls to two-to-one in the second case. In Austria, the Raiffeisen group is nowadays 
owned by circa 1.7 billion members, who represent 20 per cent of the population in 2013. The share of 
customers is slightly higher, reaching 43 per cent. Focusing on data collected at the single bank level and 
comparing Austrian figures in 2004 and 2009, the ratio fell and the number of non-member customers 
grew faster than that of members, while in Germany the opposite happened. In the case of Italy, the ratio 
was decreasing at least until 2007, whereas it started increasing again after 2009. Finally, it has to be noted 
that in some countries such as Belgium and Ireland, CBs count only members as customers, as in the case 
of credit unions. On the contrary, Slovenia and Luxemburg show the lowest member-to-customer ratios 
among European countries, as seen in Table 1.
5 Although it would be helpful to draw a more precise frame of the phenomenon described by including data on the proportion 
of members vs. non-members, both for borrower and depositors, this paper does not have the ambition of describing real 
optimal rate decisions. It instead aims to define an abstract model that gives some hints as to the determinants of various inte-
rest rates.
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TABLE 1. EUROPEAN CBS MEMBER- TO-NON-MEMBER RATIOS 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Average 
per 
country 
Austria 69,4 69,4 45,5 67,0 66,5 66,5 67,5 48,0 63,4 
Belgium   100,0      100,0 
Bulgaria 1,2 0,9 0,8 1,0  63,0   13,4 
Cyprus 0,1 0,1 89,2  50,0 86,0   45,1 
Denmark 56,1 52,5 52,5   53,0 50,0  48,5 
Germany 51,7 52,4 53,3 54,0 54,0 55,0   53,4 
Spain 17,4 18,5 19,4 19,0 20,0 21,0   19,2 
Finland 35,6 36,5  33,5 30,0 31,0 31,0 40,0 33,9 
France 38,9 38,9 37,2 45,3 47,3 54,0 50,5 71,0 45,2 
Greece 100,0 100,0 100,0     54,0 88,5 
Hungary 50,0 50,0 25,0 23,0 14,0 11,0 11,0  26,3 
Ireland 100,0        100,0 
Italy 31,8 33,2 14,8 14,0  15,0 19,0  21,5 
Japan    19,0 19,0    19,0 
Lithuania 99,0 99,2 99,2 99,0  99,0  100,0 99,2 
Luxemburg 3,9 3,8 4,6 5,0  5,0 6,0  4,7 
Netherland 16,2 17,2 18,2 18,0  23,0   18,5 
Poland 23,8 23,8 23,8 24,0     23,9 
Portugal 18,8 25,0 33,3 15,0 25,0 35,0  34,0 26,6 
Romania 100,0 75,5 68,8      81,5 
Slovenia   0,1      0,1 
Sweden 100,0 100,0 83,2      94,4 
Switzerland 62,5 45,2 45,7      51,1 
United 
Kingdom    50,0 25,0 38,0 39,0 46,0 39,6 
Average per 
year 48,1 44,5 42,9 34,6 39,4 46,9 44,7 61,6          46,5 
          
Source: EACB, key statistics, various years 
Note: Ratios are presented in percentage values 
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into an objective function, as done in conventional microeconomics. This exercise turns out to be a 
bit more complex than usual and it involves three dimensions that ought to be considered. 
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4.1. Customers vs. non-customers
First, the CBs need to be competitive in the market for long-run survival. In order to attract 
customers, the interest rates offered by CBs should be more favorable than those offered by commercial 
banks. That is, an economizing borrower or depositor will decide to become a CB customer if he receives 
at least the same, if not better, financial conditions than the outside option offers (e.g. other commercial 
banks)6. Thus, in order to be competitive, the best strategy is to offer better financial conditions than 
competitors. However, some customers might not have an outside option at all, or the search and access 
costs associated with these options may not be zero. It is such for instance in small villages, where the local 
CB is the only existent financial institution. In order to evaluate the profitability of the CB’s offer, the 
interest rate in this case would need to be considered as a composite term to capture these costs as well. In 
this paper, we assume that the outside option is available, since these mentioned considerations are not 
central to our story.
4.2. Members vs. non-members
The second dimension is the guarantee that preferential treatment will be given to members (our 
model translates special treatment into more profitable interest rates for members, acknowledging that 
other incentives can also play a role). On the one hand, from a purely risk point of view, even though the 
members are less-profitable7, they are more secure given the lower asymmetry of information regarding the 
CB’s lending risks. On the other hand, non-member customers are charged higher interest rates on loans 
and lower interest rates on deposits compared to members. They are more profitable but less safe, given 
that the CBs have less information about their risks when compared to members8. Therefore CBs ought to 
set interest rates for non-members that will enable them to be competitive in the market while at the same 
time attract enough profitable customers. The profit can be used to reward members in terms of better 
financial conditions. Moreover, non-members should not be indiscriminately considered as a riskier group, 
since soft information may sometimes be available even in their case. Given the differential terms provided 
for non-members, all else (including risk) being equal, it is possible to view members as “rent-seekers” who 
extrapolate value from “others”. 
Given this, the proportion between members and non-members in the total customer pool becomes 
strategically important choices made by the CBs, particularly those concerning interest rates. This is so 
because members gain from the CB’s lending activities to non-member customers, who pay higher interest 
rates on loans. These gains are not redistributed as profits, but translate into better terms for members. In 
some cases, the proportion of financial activities addressed to members and to non-members is given by 
6 For customers moved by altruistic behavior, offering the same conditions as competitors is enough since they would receive 
benefits through a not-for-profit organization in se. 
7 This is strictly from the perspective of CBs as a profit-oriented entity. They are less profitable since they pay lower interest rates 
than other customers and receive better terms on deposits. They receive a compensation for their participation in the risky 
capital of the CB, while the capital invested is a small amount.
8 This pertains largely to the soft information regarding the risks that are involved. CBs often operate on the strength of being 
able to collect soft information regarding their members. Here we consider non-members to be from outside the member 
community and on whom soft information is not readily available. Nowadays it is also difficult to collect soft information on 
members for various reasons, such as softer community links, larger membership and privacy laws. However, ceteris paribus, 
members can still be considered less risky since they are also CB owners. 
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existing norms9. The most extreme case is credit unions. 
In order to become members, the customers should receive incentives of better financial conditions, 
especially on loans. According to this, one would reason that even a minor improvement or gain, net of 
entry costs, should push customers to apply for membership. However, according to the data shown above, 
being a member may not always be appealing or possible. The reason for this counterintuitive evidence could 
be that customers are not always eligible to become members according to national rules (for instance, in 
Italy the customer must live within the CB’s reference area to be eligible). It seems that these non-member 
customers still prefer to be a customer of a CB rather than move to a commercial bank. This could be 
partly because CBs provide better terms on loans and deposits as compared to other outside options, even 
for non-members. Another prominent factor may relate to aspects such as the CB’s spatial proximity, 
familiarity and effective marketing.
4.3. Borrowers vs. depositors
The third dimension is related to the nature of the financial relationship that members have with their 
CB. A member, in principle, can be both a borrower and a depositor. The relative bargaining power of 
these groups within CBs depends on the number of members of each type - i.e., the majority of either 
borrowers or depositors, since decision-making follows the “one-head, one-vote” rule. As pointed out by 
Emmons and Schimd (2002), the goals of these two groups are often opposing. CBs redistribute benefits 
to members mainly through preferential interest rate policies. The borrowers get benefits via a reduction 
in the interest on loans, which in turn will cause a reduction in the CB’s earnings. The depositors ask for 
benefits through an increase in the interest rates on deposits, which in turn increase banking costs. The 
reduction in bank earnings could lead to a reduction in the interest rate paid to depositors as well. An 
increase in the interest rates paid on deposits would increase the expenditures and could result in higher 
interest rates on loans.
CBs’ management (or the relevant decision-making body - i.e. the board of directors) have to 
decide which of the two groups will receive relatively more benefits for their membership. They have 
some discretion when it comes to deciding whether to increase the interest rates on members’ deposits 
(rewarding depositors), or to reduce the interest rates on loans (rewarding borrowers). Since members 
express their power by voting in the general assembly, the directors will end up favoring the group that 
corresponds to the majority of votes. If the majority is satisfied with the management’s proposal regarding 
benefit redistribution10, it will implicitly approve them through the approval of the annual balance sheet.
In order to describe the possible preferential choices made by CBs, Smith (1984) suggests an interesting 
framework. Even though this model was originally developed for credit unions, it can be generalized to also 
describe the issues that CBs encounter. In this setup, the CB’s objective would be to maximize the value 
for members and hence, it can be translated into a straightforward constrained maximization problem. The 
main difference between this model and that of credit unions is the role of non-members along with the 
borrower-depositor distinction among members.
We can now continue to set up the model. The model’s aim is to see how optimal interest rates, both 
9 In the Italian case, it is not possible to open a new branch if the minimum member threshold (at least 200) is not available in 
the proposed area. Moreover, according to the mutuality requirements, at least 50 per cent of the CB’s risky activities, such as 
loans, should be addressed to their members to be eligible for tax reductions.
10 We implicitly assume that the members, individually and as a group, act in favor of their own benefit; therefore, altruistic 
concerns are not taken into account here. Given the “cooperative” aim, this could be a limitation of our proposed model. 
However, even though the organization is driven by a cooperative aim, members are not necessarily driven by the same goal.    
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for loans and deposits, vary for member and non-member customers taking into account the members’ 
distributional composition. This is a baseline model and we have therefore considered a situation in which 
there is no uncertainty in order to keep the analysis simple. The generalizations, though cumbersome, are 
relatively straightforward.
5. Model setup
The first step in constructing this would be to understand the financial gains that members accrue 
through their participation in a CB. Members’ Gain from Loans (NGL) and Gain from Deposits (NGD) 
need to be understood before we investigate the optimal interest rates associated with loans and deposits. 
5.1. Loans
Let the total size of the amount loaned be L, out of which αL is the share of the total loans going to 
members and (1-α)L is the share of total loans going to non-members.
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following, where iO is exogenously given11:
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Depo its (NGD) can be formulated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
The CB’s objective can be viewed as a task of finding the optimal interest rates for loans and rates 
of return for deposits for both members and non-members, so as to maximize the member’s welfare. 
After simplifying it a bit, the objective function can be written as: 
 
 
 
 
 
We also add the composition factor underlying the member structure—whether the majority 
of the members are borrowers or depositors. We can weigh the members’ net gains from loans and 
deposits with the parameter capturing the average preference towards each of these two categories. 
This parameter, γ, will take the value one if the board of the cooperative has a complete borrower 
majority while γ=1/2 will imply that the board is neutral between the interests of these two 
categories. The modified objective function will now be: 
 
 
 
The implicit assumption is that deposits and loans essentially mature after one period. 
However, this is not the case in reality, since the loans and deposits have different maturity periods 
across customers. We can modify this structure, as in Smith (1984), to introduce parameters that 
capture the proportions of loans and deposits that are retired during each period, θ, τ as well as 
discount rates δ. Assuming that a constant proportion, θ, of the loans are retired every period, the 
balances would also decline every period. While calculating the present value of net gains in a 
given period for members’ loans, one would need to account for the future stream mentioned above. 
It should be appropriately discounted for each period by a factor, δ, which we assume to be 
constant. The same applies for deposits. The objective function is to maximize the present value of 
the net gains from loans and deposits for its members. This can be written as: 
 
 
 
5.4 Constraints 
 
There are two distinct constraints that CBs face while striving to increase members’ welfare 
to its maximum level. First among these constraints is the Balance Sheet Constraint. This requires 
that total assets and liabilities should balance.  
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preferential interest rates on loans for members, and (ii) the gains from better returns on the deposits 
for members compared to other banks. Net Gain from Loans (NGL) and Net Gain from the 
Deposits (NGD) can be formulated as follows: 
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The principal assets on the left-hand side, loans (Lt) and investments (It) equal the principal liabilities 
on the right-hand side - i.e., deposits (Dt), regular reserves (Rt), and undivided earnings (Ut). Assuming 
that the reserves and undivided earnings do not vary, the portfolio changes with new loans issued and is 
constrained by the following:
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Note that τ and θ capture the proportions of loans and deposits retired during each period. Since we 
need an expression in terms of L, we substitute (2 into (1 and obtain: 
 
 
The operating profits accruing to the CBs would beπ = R−C −TR . Let r' and i' be the rates that 
reflect the weighted averages of the past loan and deposit periods and TR is the transfer to reserves. 
We can write the profit term as: 
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where FC are the fixed costs—i.e., estate planning, investment counseling, etc., and 0≤ρ<1 is the 
fraction transferred to regular reserves by legal requirements. For the sake of simplicity, we do not 
differentiate between member and non-member categories for past period loans. Introducing them, 
however, will not change the results qualitatively. 
 
Since 
 
 
the relationships in (2 upon substitution will yield: 
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and by substituting (4 into (5, we get the profit constraint aligned with the cooperative’s modus 
operandi, then set the profit to zero.   
 
+ 
 
 
(4 
       (1)
Note that τ and θ capture the proportions of loans and deposits retired during each period. Since we 
need an expression in terms of L, we substitute (2 into (1 and obtain:The operating profits accruing to the 
CBs would be  
	   12	  
The principal assets on the left-hand side, loans (Lt) and investments (It) equal the principal 
liabilities on the right-hand side—i.e., deposits (Dt), regular reserves (Rt), and undivided ear ings 
(Ut). Assuming that the reserves and undivided earni gs do not vary, the portfolio changes with new 
loans issued and is constrained by the following: 
 
   
(1                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that τ and θ capture the proportions of loans and deposits retired during each period. Since we 
need an expression in terms of L, we substitute (2 into (1 and obtain: 
 
 
The operating profits accruing to the CBs ould beπ = R−C −TR . Let r' and i' be the rates that 
reflect the weighted averages of the past loan and deposit periods and TR is transfer to res rves. 
We can write the profit term as: 
 
+ 
+ 
 
(2 
where FC are the fixed costs—i.e., estate planning, investment counseling, etc., and 0≤ρ<1 is the 
fraction transferred to regular reserves by legal requi ments. For the sake of simplicity, we do not 
differentiate between member and non-member categories for past pe iod loans. Introducing them, 
however, will not change the results qualitatively. 
 
Since 
 
 
the relationships in (2 upon substitution will yield: 
 
 
 
From this we can obtain:  
 
 
(3 
and by substituting (4 into (5, we get the profit constraint aligned with the cooperative’s modus 
operandi, then set the profit to zero.   
 
+ 
 
 
(4 
 t r’ and i’ be th rat s that reflec the weighted averages of the past loan 
and deposit periods and TR is the transfer to reserves. We can write the profit term as:
  
	   12	  
The principal assets on the left-hand side, loans (Lt) and investments (It) equal the principal 
liabilities on the right-hand side—i.e., deposits (Dt), regular reserves (Rt), and undivided earnings 
(Ut). Assuming that the reserves and undivided earnings do not vary, the portfolio changes with new 
loans issued and is constrained by the following: 
 
   
(1                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that τ and θ capture the proportions of loans and deposits retired during each period. Since we 
need an expression in terms of L, we substitute (2 into (1 and obtain: 
 
 
The operating profits accruing to the CBs would beπ = R−C −TR . Let r' and i' be the rates that 
reflect the weighted averages of the past loan and deposit periods and TR is the transfer to reserves. 
We can write the profit term as: 
 
+ 
+ 
 
(2 
where FC are the fixed costs—i.e., estate planning, investment counseling, etc., and 0≤ρ<1 is the 
fraction transferred to regular reserves by legal requirements. For the sake of simplicity, we do not 
differentiate between member and non-member categories for past period loans. Introducing them, 
however, will not change the results qualitatively. 
 
Since 
 
 
the relationships in (2 upon substitution will yield: 
 
 
 
From this we can obtain:  
 
 
(3 
and by substituting (4 into (5, we get the profit constraint aligned with the cooperative’s modus 
operandi, then set the profit to zero.   
 
+ 
 
 
(4 
       (2)
where FC are the fixed costs - i.e., estate planning, investment counseling, etc., and 0≤ρ<1 is the fraction 
transferred to regular reserves by legal requirements. For the sake of simplicity, we do not differentiate 
Optimal Interest Rates in Cooperative Banks with Non-member Customers
Catturani, I.; Venkatachalam, R.
193
JEOD - Vol.3, Issue 1 (2014)
between member and non-member categories for past period loans. Introducing them, however, will not 
change the results qualitatively.
Since
    
	   12	  
The principal assets on the left-hand side, loans (Lt) and investments (It) equal the principal 
liabilities on the right-hand side—i.e., deposits (Dt), regular reserves (Rt), and undivided earnings 
(Ut). Assuming that the reserves and undivided earnings do not vary, the portfolio changes with new 
loans issued and is constrained by the following: 
 
   
(1                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that τ and θ capture the proportions of loans and deposits retired during each period. Since we 
need an expression in terms of L, we substitute (2 into (1 and obtain: 
 
 
The operating profits accruing to the CBs would beπ = R−C −TR . Let r' and i' be the rates that 
reflect the weighted averages of the past loan and deposit periods and TR is the transfer to reserves. 
We can write the profit term as: 
 
+ 
+ 
 
(2 
where FC are the fixed costs—i.e., estate planning, investment counseling, etc., and 0≤ρ<1 is the 
fraction transferred to regular reserves by legal requirements. For the sake of simplicity, we do not 
differ ntiate betw en member and non-member ca egories for past period loans. Introducing them, 
however, will not change the results qualitatively. 
 
Since 
 
 
the relationships in (2 upon substitution will yield: 
 
 
 
From this we can obtain:  
 
 
(3 
and by substituting (4 into (5, we get the profit constraint aligned with the cooperative’s modus 
operandi, then set the profit to zero.   
 
+ 
 
 
(4 
the relationships in (2 upon substitution will yield:
             
	   12	  
The principal assets on the left-hand side, loans (Lt) and investments (It) equal the principal 
liabilities on the right-hand side—i.e., deposits (Dt), regular reserves (Rt), and undivided earnings 
(Ut). Assuming that the reserves and undivided earnings do not vary, the portfolio changes with new 
loans issued and is constrained by the following: 
 
   
(1                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that τ and θ capture the proportions of loans and deposits retired during each period. Since we 
need an expression in terms of L, we substitute (2 into (1 and obtain: 
 
 
The operating profits accruing to the CBs would beπ = R−C −TR . Let r' and i' be the rates that 
reflect the weighted averages of the past loan and deposit periods and TR is the transfer to reserves. 
We can write the profit term as: 
 
+ 
+ 
 
(2 
where FC are the fixed costs—i.e., estate planning, investment counseling, etc., and 0≤ρ<1 is the 
fraction transferred to regular reserves by legal requirements. For the sake of simplicity, we do not 
differentiate between member and non-member categories for past period loans. Introducing them, 
however, will not change the results qualitatively. 
 
Since 
 
 
the r lationships in (2 u stitution will yield: 
 
 
 
From this we can obtain:  
 
 
(3 
and by substituting (4 into (5, we get the profit constraint aligned with the cooperative’s modus 
operandi, then set the profit to zero.   
 
+ 
 
 
(4 
From this we can obtain: 
      (3)
and by substituting (4 into (5, we get the profit constraint aligned with the cooperative’s modus operandi, 
the  set t  profit to zer .
          
	   12	  
The pr ncipal assets on the left-hand side, loans (Lt) and inv stments (It) equal th  principal 
liabilities on the right-hand side—i.e., eposits (Dt), regular reserves (Rt), and undivided earni gs 
(Ut). Ass ming that the reserves and undivided earnings do not vary, the portfolio changes with new 
loans issued and is constrained by the following: 
 
   
(1                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that τ and θ capture the proportions of loans a d deposits ret red during each period. Since we 
need an expression in terms of L, we substitute (2 into (1 and obtain: 
 
 
The operating profits accruing to the CBs woul beπ = R−C −TR . Let r' and i' be the rates that 
refle t the w ig ted averages of the past loan and deposit periods and TR is the transfer to reserves. 
We can write the profit term as: 
 
+ 
+ 
 
(2 
where FC re the fixed costs—i.e., estate planning, nvestment counseling, etc., and 0≤ρ<1 is the 
fraction r sf rred to regular reserves by l gal requir m nts. For the sake of simplicity, e do not 
differentiate between memb r and non-member categories for past period loans. Introducing them, 
however, will not change the results qualitatively. 
 
Since 
 
 
the relationships in (2 upon substitution will yield: 
 
 
 
From this we can obtain:  
 
 
(3 
and by substituting (4 into (5, we get the profit constraint aligned with the cooperative’s modus 
operandi, then set the profit to zero.   
 
+ 
 
 
(4             
(4)
5.5. Determination of optimal interest rates
Compared to credit unions, CBs face a more complex problem since they define four optimal interest 
rates. Their objective can be seen as maximizing the loan and deposit net gains for members, weighted 
by the preference parameters (borrower or depositor-oriented) given the member composition. While 
determining these optimal interest rates, CBs are constrained by both the balance sheet and operating 
statement, both included in Equation (5. We set the issue as a single-period problem, given that past 
decisions are introduced in the inherited balance sheet, but they do not affect the process of maximizing 
net gains. The CB’s decision process only concerns the current rate decisions12.
The first order conditions of the constrained maximization problem are the following13:
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where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. , , the partial effects of changes in 
interest rates on profits in the above expression, are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 As Smith (1984) suggested, it is assumed that all parameters, exogenous market rates and functional relationships are 
known with certainty. 
13 We do not demonstrate here that the bordered Hessian matrix is negative definite to show that the second-order 
conditions hold. 
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We can now summarize the factors that these optimal interest rates would depend on. 
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• The optimal interest rate (on loans) for members depends on the share and size of 
total loans to members α, external interest rates and the marginal effect of (member) 
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• They depend on the discount rates and share of loans (deposits) retired every period. 
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• The optimal interest rates on non-member loans (deposits) depend on their share in 
total loans, 1-α (1-β) rates offered to members, the total loan (deposit) size, as well as 
the marginal effect of iNM on their loan (deposit) demand schedules. 
• They depend on the discount rates and share of loans (deposits) retired every period. 
• In addition, they also depend on the marginal influence of the loan (deposit) interest 
rate on profits, which in turn depends on the (partial) interest elasticity of demand for 
their loa  (deposits: ). 
 
6. Discussion and extensions 
 
We considered a single-period decision-making scenario in which CBs decide optimal interest 
rates for loans and deposits for both members and non-members. A relatively general model of CBs 
with non-member customers and with different overall orientations (depositor- or borrower-
orientation) has been proposed and thus we derived the optimal interest rates within this framework. 
According to our results, in order to be both competitive in the market and faithful to their 
cooperative aim, CB interest rate settings should include a premium determined by taking into 
account the relevant partial elasticities for each type of customer—non-members (borrowers or 
depositors) and members (borrowers or depositors). The model developed here is a generalized 
framework that includes credit unions as a particular type of CBs for which both (1-α) and (1-β) are 
equal to zero.  
The baseline model outlined above can be extended by introducing further complexities. The 
model, as we have outlined so far, has no uncertainty—i.e., no probabilities regarding default have 
been introduced. This can be modified to introduce risk factors associated with lending to different 
types of customers. This means that we have to amend the revenues and replace them with expected 
revenues. The risk factors associated with non-members and the resulting optimal interest rates 
would give a more complete description. In this exercise, we have considered how optimal interest 
rates can be derived for a given loan size (L), although we have not emphasized it throughout. The 
total loans are shared between members and non-members. The resulting shares α, (1-α) in the case 
of loans, β, (1-β) in the case of deposits, are endogenous; in turn, they depend on member and non-
member demand schedules. Alternatively, we can let the total amount of the loan vary as well. 
From the expressions for optimal interest rates, we can see how they change for members and non-
members, with respect to a change in member orientation across the spectrum (from being 
borrower-oriented to depositor-oriented). It is worth noting that α and β enter into the expressions 
for optimal rates, indicating the role played by the ratio between the outstanding loans to members 
to non-members, along with the preference-orientation parameter γ and the partial elasticity 
parameters (ε).  
Within this framework, we do not address dynamic or long-term motivations to keep non-
members appeased. Here, members as a group have opposing aims and no explicit cooperative 
behavior with non-members, although they gain from non-members, who bring in more revenues. 
Members are seen as trying to maximize their gains in the current period. However, this may not be 
the case when repeated interactions are involved. In fact, the member and non-member groups need 
to “cooperate” in order to get the best possible outcome for the community of customers as a whole. 
This means there is a scope for negotiating each group’s gains, with a long-term perspective in 
mind. The same holds for depositors and borrowers, especially when the same customer can play 
both roles. This cooperative aspect can probably be better understood in alternative frameworks that 
blend cooperative and competitive behavior (see Ray, 2007). For instance, it might be instructive to 
study the mechanics or processes by which groups reach agreements and the possibilities of 
coalition formation from a game-theoretic perspective. Alternatively, in the presence of repeated 
interactions, identifying strategies that different competing groups (such as members and non-
members) employ in the absence of non-binding agreements between them may also be useful. This 
 (de its: 
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members) employ in the absence of non-binding agreements between them may also be useful. This 
).
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6. Discussion and extensions
We considered a single-period decision-making scenario in which CBs decide optimal interest rates 
for loans and deposits for both members and non-members. A relatively general model of CBs with non-
member customers and with different overall orientations (depositor- or borrower-orientation) has been 
proposed and thus we derived the optimal interest rates within this framework. According to our results, in 
order to be both competitive in the market and faithful to their cooperative aim, CB interest rate settings 
should include a premium determined by taking into account the relevant partial elasticities for each type 
of customer - non-members (borrowers or depositors) and members (borrowers or depositors). The model 
developed here is a generalized framework that includes credit unions as a particular type of CBs for which 
both (1-α) and (1-β) are equal to zero. 
The baseline model outlined above can be extended by introducing further complexities. The model, 
as we have outlined so far, has no uncertainty - i.e., no probabilities regarding default have been introduced. 
This can be modified to introduce risk factors associated with lending to different types of customers. 
This means that we have to amend the revenues and replace them with expected revenues. The risk factors 
associated with non-members and the resulting optimal interest rates would give a more complete 
description. In this exercise, we have considered how optimal interest rates can be derived for a given loan 
size (L), although we have not emphasized it throughout. The total loans are shared between members 
and non-members. The resulting shares α, (1-α) in the case of loans, β, (1-β) in the case of deposits, are 
endogenous; in turn, they depend on member and non-member demand schedules. Alternatively, we can 
let the total amount of the loan vary as well. From the expressions for optimal interest rates, we can see 
how they change for members and non-members, with respect to a change in member orientation across 
the spectrum (from being borrower-oriented to depositor-oriented). It is worth noting that α and β enter 
into the expressions for optimal rates, indicating the role played by the ratio between the outstanding loans 
to members to non-members, along with the preference-orientation parameter γ and the partial elasticity 
parameters (ε). 
Within this framework, we do not address dynamic or long-term motivations to keep non-members 
appeased. Here, members as a group have opposing aims and no explicit cooperative behavior with non-
members, although they gain from non-members, who bring in more revenues. Members are seen as 
trying to maximize their gains in the current period. However, this may not be the case when repeated 
interactions are involved. In fact, the member and non-member groups need to “cooperate” in order to 
get the best possible outcome for the community of customers as a whole. This means there is a scope for 
negotiating each group’s gains, with a long-term perspective in mind. The same holds for depositors and 
borrowers, especially when the same customer can play both roles. This cooperative aspect can probably 
be better understood in alternative frameworks that blend cooperative and competitive behavior (see Ray, 
2007). For instance, it might be instructive to study the mechanics or processes by which groups reach 
agreements and the possibilities of coalition formation from a game-theoretic perspective. Alternatively, 
in the presence of repeated interactions, identifying strategies that different competing groups (such as 
members and non-members) employ in the absence of non-binding agreements between them may also be 
useful. This might shed light on how mutually beneficial outcomes are eventually reached for both groups, 
where there is scope for symbiotic relationships between them. Another extension includes exploring alternative 
frameworks to understand the role of non-members as well as the dynamic stability of non-member shares. 
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